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Abstract
The inertia of the local-currency prices of traded goods in the face of exchange-rate changes
is a well-documented phenomenon in International Economics. This paper develops a frame-
work for identifying the sources of local-currency price stability. The empirical approach
exploits manufacturers’ and retailers’ ﬁrst-order conditions in conjunction with detailed infor-
mation on the frequency of price adjustments in response to exchange-rate changes, in order
to quantify the relative importance of markup adjustment by manufacturers and retailers,
local-cost non-traded components, and nominal price rigidities, in the incomplete transmis-
sion of exchange-rate changes to prices. The approach is applied to micro data from the beer
market. We ﬁnd that on average, 54.1% of the incomplete exchange rate pass-through is due
to local non-traded costs; 33.7% to markup adjustment; and 12.2% to the existence of price
adjustment costs.
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11 Introduction
The incomplete transmission of exchange-rate shocks to the prices of imported goods has been the
focus of a substantial amount of theoretical and empirical research. In his 2002 article in the NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, Engel extensively discusses this research and identiﬁes three potential
sources for the incomplete exchange-rate pass-through: the existence of local costs (e.g., costs
for non-traded services) even among goods that are typically considered to be “traded”; markup
adjustment on the part of retailers and/or manufacturers; and pure nominal price rigidities (at
times also referred to as “menu costs”) that lead to what Engel has labelled “local-currency-
pricing”. Despite the signiﬁcant amount of work and interest in this topic, evidence on the
relative importance of each of the contributing factors remains mixed, in part because some
of the key variables needed to identify these factors, such as markups or local costs, are not
directly observable, especially not in aggregate data. Yet, in an era characterized by a continuing
devaluation of the dollar against other major currencies, concerns about the impact of China’s
exchange-rate policy on domestic prices, and general uncertainty about the eﬀect of exchange
rates on the unwinding of current imbalances, it is more important than ever to understand why
import prices do not fully respond to exchange-rate changes, especially since diﬀerent explanations
have very diﬀerent implications for exchange rate policy.1
Aided by the increased availability of micro data sets, a set of recent studies has focused
on the microeonomics of the cross-border transmission process, trying to identify the relative
contribution of each of the sources of this price inertia within structural models of particular
industries. The advantage of these studies is that the institutional knowledge of the industry can
be used to inform modeling assumptions, which, applied to detailed consumer or product-level
data, can deliver credible estimates of markups and local costs. The disadvantage is that the
results are not generalizable without further work on other markets. Still, as we show below, the
few studies available to date have been able to identify interesting empirical patterns that are
surprisingly robust across markets, time, and speciﬁc modeling assumptions.
The general structure of the approach proposed in this strand of the literature is as follows.
The starting point is an empirical model of the industry under consideration. The model has
three elements: demand, costs, and equilibrium conditions. The demand side is estimated ﬁrst,
independently of the supply side, using either consumer level data on individual transactions,
or product level data on market shares and prices. On the supply side, the cost function of a
producer selling in a foreign country is speciﬁed in a way that allows for both a traded, and
a non-traded, local (i.e., destination-market speciﬁc) component in this producer’s costs. The
1A recent speech that summarizes policymakers’ concerns about these issues can be found at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080307a.htm.
2distinction between traded and non-traded costs is based on the currency in which these costs are
paid. Traded costs are by deﬁnition incurred by the seller in her home country. As such, they
are subject to shocks caused by variation in the nominal exchange rate when they are expressed
in the destination market currency. In contrast, non-traded costs are deﬁned as those costs that
are not be aﬀected by exchange rate changes. Costs are treated as unobservable. Assuming that
ﬁrms act as proﬁt maximizers, the market structure of the industry in conjunction with particular
assumptions regarding ﬁrms’ strategic behavior imply a set of ﬁrst-order conditions. Once the
demand side parameters are estimated, these ﬁrst-order conditions can be exploited to back out
the marginal costs and markups in the industry. Based on the speciﬁed cost function, marginal
costs are further decomposed into a traded and non-traded component.
With this decomposition in place, one then examines how the particular components of prices
(traded cost component, non-traded cost component, and markup) respond to exchange-rate
changes. The lack of price response is accordingly attributed to either markup adjustment, or
to the existence of a local, non-traded cost component. While the results of this decomposition
naturally vary by industry, it seems that existing studies are in agreement that markup adjustment
is a big part of the story. The observed exchange-rate pass-through is however too low to be
explained by markup adjustment alone; accordingly, the role attributed to non-traded costs in
explaining the incomplete price response is non-trivial.
While the above framework allows one to evaluate the relative contributions of markup adjust-
ment and non-traded costs in explaining incomplete exchange-rate pass-through, it is inherently
unsuitable to assessing the role of the third potential source of the incomplete price response:
the existence of ﬁxed costs of repricing. There are two reasons for this inadequacy. The ﬁrst
reason is a conceptual one. A key element of the framework described above is the premise that
the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions hold every period. Given that by assumption ﬁrms are always at
the equilibrium implied by their proﬁt maximizing conditions, there is no role in this framework
for price adjustment costs that would cause ﬁrms to (temporarily) deviate from their optimal
behavior. The second reason is a practical one. Because the data used in most previous studies
are either annual or monthly, and because they are often the outcome of aggregation across more
disaggregate product categories, we observe product level prices changing in every period. But
with prices adjusting every period, it is inherently impossible to identify potential costs of repric-
ing, which by nature imply that prices should remain ﬁxed. Hence, to the extent that such price
rigidities are present, these may be masked by the aggregation across diﬀerent product lines, and
across shorter time periods (e.g., weeks), over which nominal prices may exhibit inertia. This may
lead one to overstate the role of non-traded services: whatever portion of incomplete pass-through
cannot be accounted for by markup adjustment, will by construction be attributed to non-traded
costs, when in reality (and in a more general framework) it could be due to the existence of price
3adjustment costs.
The current paper attempts to overcome this shortcoming by explicitly introducing price
rigidities into the model and suggesting an approach for quantifying their importance in explaining
the documented incomplete cross-border transmission of exchange-rate shocks. To this end, we
introduce two new elements.
The ﬁrst one is to modify the standard framework of proﬁt maximization to allow ﬁrms to
deviate from their ﬁrst-order conditions due to the existence of ﬁxed costs of repricing. In this
context we deﬁne costs of repricing in the broadest possible sense as all factors that may cause
ﬁrms to keep their prices constant, and hence potentially deviate from the optimum implied
by static proﬁt maximization. Such factors may include the small costs of re-pricing (the so-
called “menu-costs”) as well as the more substantive costs associated with the management’s
time and eﬀort in ﬁguring out the new optimal price, the additional costs of advertising and more
generally communicating the price change to the consumers, and — to the extent that one wants
to incorporate dynamic considerations in the analysis — the option value of keeping the price
unchanged in the face of ongoing uncertainty.
The second innovation of the paper is on the data side. In order to identify the potential
role of nominal price rigidities we propose using higher frequency (weekly or bi-weekly) data
on the prices of highly disaggregate, well-deﬁned product lines. The advantage of using high-
frequency data is that we observe many periods during which the price of a product remains
utterly unchanged, followed by a discrete jump of the price to a new level. It is this discreteness
in the price adjustment that we exploit in order to identify the role of nominal price rigidities.
The basic idea behind our approach is as follows. First, even with nominal price rigidities, we
can estimate the demand and cost parameters of the model along the lines described in earlier
papers by constraining the estimation to the periods for which we observe price adjustment; the
underlying premise is that once a ﬁrm decides to incur the adjustment cost associated with a
price change, it will set the product’s price according to the ﬁrst-order conditions of its proﬁt
maximization problem. This of course does not imply that this ﬁrm’s behavior will be unaﬀected
by the existence of price rigidities. Such rigidities may still have an indirect eﬀect on the pricing
behavior of ﬁrms that adjust their prices, as in any model of oligopolistic interaction ﬁrms take
the prices (or quantities) of their competitors into account; if the competitor prices do not change
in particular period (possibly because of price rigidities), this will aﬀect the pricing behavior of
the ﬁrms that do adjust prices. The estimation procedure takes this indirect eﬀect into account.
O n c et h em o d e lp a r a m e t e r sa r ee s t i m a t e d ,w ee xploit information from both the periods
in which prices adjust and periods in which prices remain unchanged to derive bounds on the
adjustment costs associated with a price change. Our approach is based on the insight that in
periods in which prices change, it has to be the case that the costs of price adjustment are lower
4than the additional proﬁtt h eﬁrm makes by changing its price; we can use this insight to derive
an upper bound of this price adjustment cost. Similarly, in periods in which prices do not change,
it has to be the case that the costs of adjustment exceed the extra proﬁt associated with a price
change; based on this insight, we can derive a lower bound for the price adjustment cost.
The costs of price adjustment are a concept that has a precise meaning within the context of
our model; they are deﬁned in the broadest possible sense as everything that prevents a ﬁrm from
adjusting its price in a particular period, including concerns about losing customers in the future,
rather than the literal labor or material costs a ﬁrm has to pay to change prices. As such, they
are not directly comparable to estimates obtained in earlier studies using diﬀerent methods (e.g.,
direct measurement or ﬁrm surveys).2 More importantly, the adjustments costs alone do not allow
a full assessment of the impact of nominal price rigidities on exchange-rate pass-through; because
such rigidities have both a direct and an indirect (operating through the competitor prices) eﬀect
on ﬁrms’ pricing behavior, it is possible that very small rigidities induce signiﬁcant price inertia.
To provide an overall assessment of the impact of price adjustment costs we therefore perform
simulations that compare the pricing behavior with price rigidities to the one that would prevail
with fully ﬂexible prices. The diﬀerential response of prices in the two scenarios is attributed
to the eﬀect of nominal price rigidities. In the same step we also identify the role of markup
adjustment and non-traded costs in generating incomplete pass-through.
We apply the framework described above to weekly, store-level data for the beer market. The
beer market is well suited for investigating questions related to exchange-rate pass-through and
price rigidities for several reasons: (1) a signiﬁcant fraction of brands are imported and hence
aﬀected by exchange-rate ﬂuctuations; (2) exchange-rate pass-through onto consumer prices is
low, on the order of 7-10%; (3) there exist highly disaggregate, weekly data on both wholesale and
retail prices; this allows us to examine how prices respond at each stage of the distribution chain;
(4) both non-traded local costs and price rigidities are a-priori plausible; in particular, weekly
data reveal that both wholesale and retail prices remain constant over the course of several weeks,
suggesting the existence of price rigidities. The framework we propose is however not tailored to
the beer market, and can be more generally applied to any market for which high frequency data
are available so that the points of price adjustment can be identiﬁed.
Our analysis yields several interesting ﬁndings. First, at the descriptive level, we document
2There have been several attempts in the literature to measure price adjustment costs. Levy et al (1997) ﬁnd
menu costs to equal 0.70 percent of supermarkets’ revenue from time-use data. Dutta et al (1999) ﬁnd menu costs
to equal 0.59 percent of drugstores’ revenue. Levy et al have four measures of menu costs: 1. the labor cost to
change prices; 2. the costs to print and deliver new price tags; 3. the costs of mistakes; 4. the costs of in-store
supervision of the price changes. Some detailed microeconomic studies have cast doubt on the importance of menu
cost in price rigidity. Blinder et al (1998) ﬁnd in a direct survey that managers do not regard menu costs as an
important cause of price rigidity. Both Carlton (1986) and Midrigan (2006) ﬁnd that ﬁrms change prices frequently
and in small increments, which is not consistent with a menu-cost explanation of price rigidity.
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seems to be primarily driven by the infrequent adjustment of wholesale rather than retail prices.
In our data, there is not a single instance where a product’s retail price remains unchanged in
response to a wholesale price change. In contrast, there are several instances in which the retail
price changes, while the wholesale price does not. Hence it seems that the primary reason that
retail prices do not change from period to period is that there is little reason for them to change,
as the underlying wholesale prices remain ﬁxed.
Perhaps not surprisingly given the above documented price adjustment patterns, we estimate
price adjustment costs at the retail level to be low relative to such costs at the wholesale level.
In particular, employing a procedure analogous to Levy et al (1997) to calculate menu costs as a
percentage of ﬁrm revenue3, we estimate that price adjustment costs represent on average 0.1%
of the revenue at the retail level, while they account for approximately 0.5% of the revenue at the
wholesale level.
As we discussed above, nominal price rigidities may aﬀect the pricing decisions of a particular
producer in two ways. First, they may prevent this producer from adjusting her price, because
her own costs of repricing exceed the beneﬁts, even when all other competing producers adjust
their prices (direct eﬀect). Second, such costs may induce other competing producers to keep their
prices ﬁxed, which may make price adjustment less proﬁtable for the producer under consideration
(indirect/strategic eﬀect). Our simulations indicate that the direct eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the
wholesale level, accounting for 10.5% on average for the incomplete pass-through. Interestingly,
there is substantial variation in this estimate across brands; the own costs of price adjustment
appear to be more important for brands with low market shares, such as Bass and Beck’s than for
brands with large market shares such as Corona and Heineken. In contrast, we ﬁnd that at the
retail level the own costs of repricing have no eﬀect; this is perhaps not surprising given the small
magnitude of repricing costs we estimate at that level. There is however an indirect/strategic eﬀect
at this stage of the distribution chain that accounts for approximately 0.1% of the incomplete pass-
through. Overall it seems that the direct eﬀect of repricing costs is only present at the wholesale
level, while the indirect/strategic eﬀect plays a role both at the wholesale and retail levels. Our
ﬁnal decomposition attributes 54.1% of the incomplete pass-through to local non-traded costs
(52.5% at the wholesale and 1.6% at the retail level); 33.7% to markup adjustment (33.5% at the
wholesale and 0.2% at the retail level); and 12.2% to the existence of price adjustment costs, 1.7%
3This procedure involves summing up the estimated upper bounds for the price adjustment costs for those
periods within a year in which prices did change, and then dividing this sum by the ﬁrm’s revenue over the entire
year. We should emphasize that because our “price adjustment costs” are deﬁn e di nt h em o s tg e n e r a ls e n s et o
include all factors that may prevent ﬁrms from changing their nominal prices (and not just the literal labor and
material costs of changing prices), our numbers are not directly comparable to Levy et al’s. Still, it is interesting
that despite these diﬀerences the two sets of numbers are of similar order of magnitude.
6of which represent the indirect/strategic eﬀect of such costs. As suspected at the beginning, costs
of price adjustment appear to be substantially more important at the wholesale than retail level.
The approach we just described is static. While estimating a full dynamic model would of
course be desirable, the complexity of our setup and model does not allow us to do so (at least
not without simplifying parts of the model that we consider essential to our analysis, such as the
strategic interactions between domestic and foreign ﬁrms as well as the retailer and manufacturers,
the ﬂexibility of the demand substitution patterns, and the consistent treatment of the cost side).
However, we believe that there are two particular features of this market that allow us to abstract
from dynamics without sacriﬁcing the realism and relevance of our model. First, neither consumers
nor sellers hold inventories for beer.4 Second, the primary source of cost variation facing beer
s e l l e r sa n df o c u so fo u ra n a l y s i si st h eexchange rate, which is highly persistent.5 This implies that
the premise of static expectations is not unreasonable here. If the exchange rate were the only
source of cost variation, and exchange rate shocks were perceived as permanent, the static model
would be equivalent to a dynamic one up to a discount factor: ﬁrms would be maximizing the
sum over the (discounted) proﬁts of each period, which in the absence of any cross-period price
eﬀects or inventories would be equivalent to maximizing period-by-period proﬁts (Dixit 1991). If
the exchange rate is the primary (but not only) source of cost variation and it is highly persistent,
our model provides a reasonable approximation to a dynamic setup. We discuss these issues
formally in Section 3.3.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. To set the stage, we start by providing
a brief description of the market and the data in the next section; in the same section, we
also provide some descriptive statistics and discuss the price adjustment patterns evident in the
retail and wholesale price data. Section 3 discusses the model and shows how it allows us to
derive bounds for the price adjustment costs. Section 4 discusses the steps of the empirical
implementation of the model in detail. Section 5 presents the estimation and simulation results,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Market and the Data
In this section we describe the market our data cover. We present summary statistics and some
preliminary descriptive results to build intuition for the results from the structural model. We
then discuss some of the price-adjustment patterns in the data.
4The role of inventories has been emphasized in several recent papers by Hendel and Nevo (2006a and 2006b),
Pesendorfer (2002), Aguirregabiria (1999), and Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2008). We refer the reader to
section 3.3 for a detailed discussion of how the arguments put forth in these papers aﬀect our analysis.
5The consensus among International economists is that the exchange rate follows a random walk.
72.1 Market
The imported beer market ﬁrst developed in the U.S. in the nineteenth century. As late as 1970,
imported beers made up less than one percent of the total U.S. consumption of beer. Consumption
of imported brands grew slowly in the 1980s and by double digits for each year in the 1990s — on
average by 11 percent per year from 1993 to 2001. Beer is an example of one type of imported
goods: packaged goods imported for consumption. Such imports do not require any further
manufacture before reaching consumers and make up roughly half of the non-oil goods imports
to the U.S. over the sample period.
The beer market is well suited for an exploration of the sources of local-currency price sta-
bility for the reasons discussed in the introduction: a signiﬁcant fraction of brands are imported;
exchange-rate pass-through to prices is generally low (between eight and ten percent); both non-
traded local costs and price stickiness due to adjustments costs are a-priori plausible; last but
not least, we have a rich panel data set with weekly retail and wholesale prices. It is unusual
to observe both retail and wholesale prices for a single product over time. These data enable us
to separate us to isolate the role of local non-traded costs and of ﬁxed adjustment costs in ﬁrms’
incomplete transmission of exchange-rate shocks to prices.
2.2 Data
Our data come from Dominick’s Finer Foods, the second-largest supermarket chain in the Chicago
metropolitan area in the mid 1990s with a market share of roughly 20 percent. The data record
the retail and wholesale prices for each product sold by Dominick’s over a period of four years.
They were gathered by the Kilts Center for Marketing at the University of Chicago’s Graduate
School of Business and include aggregate retail volume market shares and retail prices for every
major brand of beer sold in the U.S.6 Beer shipments in this market are handled by independent
wholesale distributors. The model we develop in the next section of the paper abstracts from
this additional step in the vertical chain, and assumes distributors are vertically integrated with
brewers, in the sense that brewers bear their distributors’ costs and control their pricing decisions.
It is common knowledge in the industry that brewers set their distributors’ prices through a
practice known as resale price maintenance and cover a signiﬁcant portion of their distributors’
marginal costs.7 This practice makes the analysis of pricing behavior along the distribution chain
6The data can be found at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/kilts/research/db/dominicks/.
7Features of the Dominicks’ wholesale-price data conﬁrm that brewers control distributors prices to the super-
market. Across individual Dominicks’ stores, which may each be served by a diﬀerent distributor, each with an
exclusive territory, the variation in UPC-level wholesale prices is less than one cent. Asker (2004) notes that one
cannot distinguish distributors by observing the wholesale prices they charge to individual Dominicks stores. This
supports the industry lore that distributors pricing is coordinated by brewers and is not set separately by each
distributor to each retail outlet.
8relatively straight-forward, as one can assume that distributors are, de facto, vertically integrated
with brewers.
During the 1990s supermarkets increased the selection of beers they oﬀered as well as the
total shelf space devoted to beer. A study from this period found that beer was the tenth most
frequently purchased item and the seventh most proﬁtable item for the average U.S. supermarket.8
Supermarkets sell approximately 20 percent of all beer consumed in the U.S.9
We aggregate data from each Dominick’s store into one of two price zones. For more details
about this procedure, see Hellerstein (2008).10 We deﬁne a product as one six-pack serving of a
brand of beer and quantity as the total number of servings sold per week. We deﬁne a market as
one of Dominick’s price zones in one week. Products’ market shares are calculated with respect
to the potential market which is deﬁned as the total beer purchased each week in supermarkets
by the residents of the zip codes in which each Dominick’s s t o r ei sl o c a t e d .W ed e ﬁne the outside
good to be all beer sold by other supermarkets to residents of the same zip codes as well as
all beer sales in the sample’s Dominick’s stores not already included in our sample. We have a
total of 16 brands in our sample (5 domestic and 11 imported), each with 404 observations (202
weeks spanning the period from June 6, 1991 to June 1, 1995 in each of two price zones). We
supplement the Dominick’s data with information on manufacturer costs, product characteristics,
advertising, and the distribution of consumer demographics. Product characteristics come from
the ratings of a Consumer Reports study conducted in 1996. Summary statistics for the price
data are provided in Table 1. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the characteristics data used
in the demand estimation.
2.3 Preliminary Descriptive Results
We begin the analysis by documenting in several simple regressions whether Dominick’s imported-
beer prices are systematically related to movements in bilateral nominal exchange-rates. These
results can provide a benchmark against which we can measure the performance of the structural
8Canadian Trade Commissioner (2000).
9As our data focus on one metropolitan statistical area, we do not need to control for variation in retail alcohol
sales regulations. Such regulations can diﬀer considerably across states.
10The zones are deﬁned by Dominick’s mainly on the basis of customer demographics. Although they do not
report these zones, we identify them through zip-code level demographics (with a few exceptions, each Dominick’s
store in our sample is the only store located in its zip code) and by comparing the average prices charged for the
same product across stores. We classify each store according to its pricing behavior as a low- or high-price store and
then aggregate sales across the stores in each pricing zone. This aggregation procedure retains some cross-sectional
variation in the data which is helpful for the demand estimation. Residents’ income covaries positively with retail
prices across the two zones.
9model. We estimate three price equations:
(1) lnpr
jzt = cj + ζz + θt + αlnejt + β lncojt + εjzt
(2) lnpw
jzt = cj + ζz + θt + αlnejt + β lncojt + εjzt
(3) lnpr
jzt = cj + ζz + θt + αlnpw
jzt + εjt
where the subscripts j, z, and t refer to product, zone, and week respectively; pr is the product’s
retail price; pw is the product’s wholesale price; cj, θt,a n dζz are product, week and zone dummies
respectively that proxy among other things for demand shocks that may aﬀect a brand’s price
independent of exchange rates; e is the bilateral nominal exchange rate (domestic-currency units
per unit of foreign currency); cojt denotes a set of variables that proxy for cost shocks that again
may aﬀect prices; such variables include measures of domestic (U.S.) wages, the price of barley
in each country producing beer in our sample, the price of electricity in the Chicago area, and
- for foreign brands - wages in each beer exporting country in our sample; ε is a random error
term. All variables are speciﬁed in levels, and not ﬁrst diﬀerences, as our focus is on the long-run
pass-through of exchange rate changes, and not the short-term dynamics.
Table 3 reports results from OLS estimation of the pricing equations. Columns 1 and 3 report
results from speciﬁcations that include the full set of controls speciﬁed above, while in columns 2
and 4 the cost controls are omitted (since the latter do not vary at the weekly level). The results
across the two speciﬁcations are remarkably similar. The average pass-through elasticity α for the
retail price is - based on column 2 - 6.7 percent and is signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. The
regression establishes a roughly 7-percent benchmark for the retailer’s pass-through elasticity, that
we will try to explain within the framework of the structural model. The fourth column of Table
3 reports similar results from estimation of the wholesale-price pricing equation, equation (2):I t s
pass-through elasticity is 4.7 percent, and the coeﬃcient is again highly signiﬁcant. Finally, the
ﬁfth column of Table 3 reports the results from an OLS regression of each brand’s retail price on
its own wholesale price. The coeﬃcient on the wholesale price is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
100, which is consistent with the results from the other columns: Exchange-rate shocks that are
passed on by manufacturers to the retailer appear to be immediately and almost fully passed on
to consumer prices.
This preliminary analysis reveals that local-currency price stability is an important feature of
this market: only around 7 percent of an exchange-rate change is transmitted to a beer’s retail
price. Where does the other 93 percent go? Existing literature on exchange rate pass-through has
10identiﬁed three potential sources of this incomplete transmission: a non-traded cost component
in the manufacturing of traded goods, variable markups, and nominal price rigidities. The goal of
our paper is to quantify the relative contribution of each of these sources in explaining incomplete
pass-through.
2.4 Patterns of Price Adjustment in the Data
A rough idea of the timing and frequency of price changes in the beer market can be obtained
from Figure 1, which plots the retail and wholesale prices for a six-pack of the British brand Bass
Ale.T h eﬁgure covers the full sample period, from the middle of 1991 to the middle of 1995. The
plot serves to illustrate several interesting points.
First, the ﬁgure demonstrates the advantage of observing price data at a weekly frequency.
Such data are ideal for analyzing the role of price stickiness, since we clearly see prices remaining
constant for several weeks, and then jumping up (in a discrete step) to a new level. This pattern
in the price adjustment process is exactly the one we would expect with price stickiness. That
said, the infrequent adjustment of prices is by itself no deﬁnitive proof that price rigidities exist,
as it is in principle possible that prices do not change simply because nothing else changes.
Second, a substantial fraction of the price variation reﬂects temporary price reductions (sales).
To investigate if there was a systematic pattern in sales, we estimated sales determinant speciﬁ-
cations similar to those in Pesendorfer (2002). Interestingly, in our sample of beer brands, sales
appear to be random, in the sense that we did not ﬁnd anything that could predict the timing
of a sale. In particular, we did not ﬁnd that the time that had elapsed since a previous sale,
holiday dummies, or sales for other brands, could predict a current sale for a particular brand.
This apparent randomness of sales in our sample is consistent with a Varian-type explanation of
temporary price reductions. A potential problem with such an explanation is that in Varian’s
model ﬁrms randomize prices each period, so that the notion of a “regular price” does not exist.
However, in the Varian (1980) model there are no costs of price adjustment. Introducing costs
of price adjustment (as we do in this paper) can explain the existence of “regular prices” that is
evident in Figures 1 and 2. We should point out that we by no means claim that the patterns we
observe in our data for beer generalize to other product categories. In fact, there is substantial
evidence, based on Pesendorfer (2002) and recent papers by Hendel and Nevo (2006a and 2006b),
that intertemporal considerations, such as those emphasized in models by Sobel (1984) and Pe-
sendorfer (2002), are important in determining sales in other products that are more storable.
Our ﬁndings regarding the timing of sales for beer are consistent with our premise throughout the
paper that consumers do not store beer, so that intertemporal considerations, while potentially
important in other markets, are not a ﬁrst order concern here. We discuss this issue in more
11detail in Section 3.3.
Third, a striking feature of Figure 1 is that retail prices always adjust when wholesale prices
adjust. So it seems that the main reason retail prices do not change in this market is that there
is little reason for them to change (the cost facing retailers as measured by the wholesale price
does not change). This is to be contrasted with the pattern we observe at the wholesale level:
despite enormous variation in exogenous (to the industry) factors aﬀecting manufacturer costs
(i.e., exchange-rate ﬂuctuations), wholesale prices remain unchanged for long periods of time.
A ﬁnal point that Figure 1 together with similar plots for other brands illustrates is that price
adjustment is not synchronized across brands. Given the strategic interactions between ﬁrms,
this asynchronous price adjustment can generate signiﬁcant price inertia, even if the nominal
price rigidities facing each individual manufacturer or retailer are estimated to be small.
3M o d e l
This section describes the supply and demand sides of the model we use to identify the sources
of incomplete exchange rate pass-through, and in particular the role of price rigidities.
3.1 Supply
We model the supply side of the market using a linear-pricing model in which manufacturers,
acting as Bertrand oligopolists with diﬀerentiated products, set their prices followed by retailers
who set their prices taking the wholesale prices they observe as given. Thus, a double margin is
added to the marginal cost of the product before it reaches the consumer. Our framework builds
on Hellerstein’s (2008) work on the beer market, but makes two modiﬁcations to her model:
First, we introduce price rigidities both at the wholesale and retail level; the eﬀect of these price
rigidities is to cause ﬁrms to potentially deviate from their ﬁrst-order conditions. Second, to keep
the framework as simple and transparent as possible, we model both retailers and manufacturers
as single-product ﬁrms. While this assumption may be hard to defend, especially in the context
of the retailers, it is not essential for the approach we propose in order to identify price rigidities,
and can be relaxed in the future.11
The strategic interaction between manufacturer and retailer is as follows. First, the manu-
facturer decides whether or not to change the product’s price taking into account the current
period’s observables (costs, demand conditions, and competitor prices), and the anticipated reac-
tion of the retailer. If she decides to change the price, then the new price is determined based on
11The assumption of single-product retailers would however be valid if manufacturers were able to enact vertical
restraints, hence exercising control over retailers’ brand-level pricing and promotional decisions. In this case,
retailers will act as if they were single-product ﬁrms with respect to each brand.
12the manufacturer’s ﬁrst-order conditions. Otherwise the wholesale price is the same as in the pre-
vious period. Next, the retailer observes the wholesale price set by the manufacturer and decides
whether or not to change the product’s retail price. If the retail price changes, then the new retail
price is determined according to the retailer’s ﬁrst-order conditions. Otherwise the retail price is
the same as in the previous period. To characterize the equilibrium we use backward induction
and solve the retailer’s problem ﬁrst.
3.1.1 Retailer
Consider a retail ﬁrm that sells all of the market’s J diﬀerentiated products. Let all ﬁrms use
linear pricing and face constant marginal costs. The proﬁts of the retail ﬁrm associated with












The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o ﬁt expression is standard. The variable pr
jt is the price the retailer sets
for product j, pw
jt is the wholesale price paid by the retailer for product j, ntcr
jt are local non-
traded12 costs paid by the retailer to sell product j, and sjt(p
r
t) is the quantity demanded of
product j which is a function of the prices of all J products. The new element in our approach is
the introduction of the second term, Ar
jt, which captures the ﬁxed cost of changing the price of
product j at time t. This cost is zero if the price remains unchanged from the previous period,
but takes on a positive value, known to the retailer, but unknown to the econometrician, if the
price adjusts in the current period:
Ar




jt > 0 if pr
jt 6= pr
jt−1
We interpret the adjustment cost Ar
jt as capturing all possible sources of price rigidity. These
can include the management’s cost of calculating the new price; the marketing and advertising
expenditures associated with communicating the new price to customers; the costs of printing
and posting new price tags, etc...The particular interpretation of Ar
jt is not important for our
purposes. What is important is that this cost is independent of the sales volume; it is a discrete
cost that the retailer pays every time the price adjusts from the previous period. The indexing of
A by product j and time t in our notation corresponds to the most ﬂexible speciﬁcation, in which
the price adjustment cost is allowed to vary by product and time. One could potentially impose
12We use the term “non-traded” to indicate that these costs are paid in dollars no matter what the origin of the
product is. Hence, non-traded costs will not be aﬀected by exchange rate shocks.
13more structure by assuming that adjustment costs are constant over time, and/or constant across
products.
The implication of the adjustment cost in the proﬁt function is that it can cause ﬁrms to deviate
from their ﬁrst-order conditions, even if the retailer acts as a proﬁt maximizer. Speciﬁcally, in
the data we will observe one of two cases:
Case 1: The price changes from the previous period, that is pr
jt 6= pr
jt−1.
In this case the retailer solves the standard proﬁt maximization problem to determine the new
optimal price, and the observed retail price pr











=0 ,f o rj =1 ,2,...,J t.
This gives us a set of J equations, one for each product. One can solve for the markups by deﬁning
a J × J matrix Ωrt, called the retailer reaction matrix, with all oﬀ-diagonal elements equal to




jt j =1 ,...,J, that is the marginal change
in the jth product’s market share given a change in the jth product’s retail price. The stacked
ﬁrst-order conditions can be rewritten in vector notation:










where the retail price for product j in market t will be the sum of its wholesale price, non-traded
costs, and markup.
T h ep r e s e n c eo ft h ea d j u s t m e n tc o s t sAr
jt in the proﬁt function implies that for the retailer to
c h a n g eh e rp r i c ei nt h ec u r r e n tp e r i o d ,i tw i l lh a v et ob et h ec a s et h a tt h ee x t r ap r o ﬁts associated
























kt) denotes the counterfactual market share that product j would have, if the
retailer had kept the price unchanged to pr
jt−1,a n dpr
kt denotes the prices of the other products k
that may or may not have changed from the previous period. The above inequality simply states
that the proﬁts the retailer makes by adjusting the price of product j in the current period have
to be greater than the proﬁts the retailer would have achieved, if she had not changed the price
14(in which case the ﬁrst-order condition of proﬁt maximization would have been violated, but the
retailer would have saved on the adjustment costs Ar
jt). By rearranging terms we can use the
above inequality to derive an upper bound Ar






















Case 2: The price remains unchanged from the previous period, that is pr
jt = pr
jt−1.
In this case the ﬁrst-order conditions of proﬁt maximization do not necessarily hold. If the
retailer does not adjust the price of product j in period t,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tt h ep r o ﬁts she
makes from keeping the price constant are at least as large as the proﬁts the retailer would have
made if she had adjusted the price according to the ﬁrst-order condition minus the adjustment























jt denotes the counterfactual price the retailer would have charged if he behaved accord-
ing to the optimality conditions, and sc
jt(prc
jt,p r
kt) is the counterfactual m a r k e ts h a r et h a tw o u l d
correspond to this optimal price holding the prices of the competitor products at their observed

























The essence of our empirical approach to quantify the adjustment costs can be described
as follows. First, we estimate the demand function. Once the demand parameters have been
estimated, the market share function sjt(pr






jt can be treated as known. Next we exploit the ﬁrst-order conditions for each product j (6)
to estimate the non-traded costs and markups of product j, but contrary to the approach typically
employed in the Industrial Organization literature, we use only the periods in which the price of
product j adjusts, to back out costs and markups. In periods when the price does not adjust,
the non-traded costs are not identiﬁed based on the ﬁrst-order conditions; however, we can derive
estimates of the non-traded costs for these periods by imposing some additional structure on the
problem, e.g., by modeling non-traded costs parametrically as a function of observables along the
lines described in the next section. Once estimates of non-traded costs for these periods have
been derived, we can calculate the counterfactual price prc
jt that the retailer would have charged
15if there were no price rigidities and she behaved according to the proﬁt maximization conditions,
as well as the associated counterfactual market share sc
jt(prc
jt,pr
kt).I nt h eﬁnal step, we can exploit
inequalities (10) and (12) to derive upper and lower bounds of the adjustment costs Ar
jt.
Note that in the above framework price rigidities as captured by the adjustment cost Ar
jt
aﬀect pricing behavior in two ways. First, there is a direct eﬀect: price rigidities may prevent the
retailer from adjusting the price of any particular product if the adjustment cost associated with
this product’s price change exceeds the additional proﬁt. Second, there is an indirect eﬀect that
operates through the eﬀect that price rigidities may have on the prices of competing products.
When our retailer sets the price of product j, she conditions on the prices of the other products
with which product j competes. If these prices remain constant (potentially because of the
existence of price rigidities), then the price change of product j may be smaller than the one
we would have observed if price rigidities were altogether non-existent. The existence of this
indirect eﬀect implies that relatively small adjustment costs can potentially lead to signiﬁcant
price inertia. Accordingly, the magnitude of the adjustment costs cannot by itself provide a
measure of the signiﬁcance of price stickiness in explaining incomplete pass-through. To assess
the overall impact of price adjustment costs it is necessary to perform simulations to compare the
pricing behavior we observe to the one that would prevail with fully ﬂexible prices.
3.1.2 Manufacturers
Let there be M manufacturers that each produce one of the market’s Jt diﬀerentiated products.
Each manufacturer chooses its wholesale price pw
jt taking the retailer’s anticipated behavior into












t )) − Aw
jt
where cw
jt is the marginal cost incurred by the manufacturer to produce and sell product j;t h i sc o s t
is in turn a function of traded costs tcw
jt,and destination-market speciﬁc non-traded costs ntcw
jt.
As noted above, the distinction between traded and non-traded costs is based on the currency in
which these costs are paid; traded costs are by deﬁnition incurred in the manufacturer’s home
country currency, and are subject to exchange rate shocks, while (dollar-denominated) non-traded
costs are not. The term Aw
jt denotes the price adjustment cost incurred by the manufacturer. The
interpretation of this cost is similar to the one for the retail adjustment cost; it is a discrete cost
that is paid only when the manufacturer adjusts the price of product j:
Aw




jt > 0 if pw
jt 6= pw
jt−1
16Given this structure, we can use the same procedure as the one we applied to the retailer’s
problem in order to derive upper and lower bounds for the manufacturer adjustment cost. The
derivation of the manufacturer bounds is however more complicated as the manufacturer needs
to take into account the possibility that the retailer does not adjust her price due to the existence
of the retailer adjustment cost.
As with the retailer, in the data we will observe one of two cases:
Case 1: The wholesale price changes from the previous period, that is pw
jt 6= pw
jt−1.
Due to the existence of the retail adjustment cost, it is — in principle — possible in this case
that the retail price does not adjust, while the wholesale price does adjust. However, in our data
we do not observed a single instance of this happening. We therefore concentrate our discussion
on the case where the retail price adjusts when the wholesale price adjusts.
Assuming that manufacturers act as proﬁt maximizers, the wholesale price pw
jt must satisfy the
ﬁrst-order proﬁt-maximizing conditions given that it has been adjusted from the previous period:






=0for j =1 ,2,...,J t.
This gives us another set of J equations, one for each product. Let Ωwt be the manufacturer’s





jt , the change in each product’s share with respect to a
change in each product’s wholesale price. The manufacturer’s reaction matrix is a transformation
of the retailer’s reaction matrix: Ωwt = Ω0
ptΩrt where Ωpt is a J-by-J matrix of the partial
derivative of each retail price with respect to each product’s wholesale price. Each column of Ωpt
contains the entries of a response matrix computed without observing the retailer’s marginal costs.
The properties of this manufacturer response matrixa r ed e s c r i b e di ng r e a t e rd e t a i li nV i l l a s - B o a s
(2007).13
The manufacturers’ marginal costs (which are a function of the traded and non-traded costs,
tcw
t and ntcw






For product j, the wholesale price is the sum of the manufacturer traded costs, non-traded costs,
and markup function. The manufacturer of product j can use her estimate of the retailer’s non-
traded costs and reaction function to compute how a change in the manufacturer price will aﬀect
the retail price for the product.
13To obtain expressions for this matrix, one uses the implicit-function theorem to totally diﬀerentiate the retailer’s
ﬁrst-order condition for product j with respect to all retail prices and with respect to the manufacturer’s price p
w
f .
17For the manufacturer to have changed her price from the previous period, it has to be the
case that the proﬁts she makes from having changing the price (net of the price adjustment cost
Aw



















This condition is similar to inequality (6) for the retailer, with a slight diﬀerence: the coun-
terfactual market share sc
jt that the manufacturer would face if she left the price of product j
unchanged is a function of the counterfactual retail price prc
jt that the retailer would charge when
faced with an unchanged wholesale price pw
jt−1. But given the existence of the retail adjustment
cost, this counterfactual price can follow one of two scenarios: the ﬁrst one is that the retailer
does not change the price from the previous period, so that prc
jt = pr
jt−1; the second possibility
is that the retailer adjusts her price according to the retailer’s ﬁrst-order conditions (6). Hence,
before one can use the above inequality to infer the upper bound of the manufacturer’s adjustment
























the retailer will leave her price unchanged. Otherwise, she will adjust her price to prc
jt,w h e r eprc
jt













Once the optimal pricing behavior of the retailer, conditional on the wholesale price being equal
to pw
jt−1has been determined, the upper bound of the manufacturer’s adjustment cost Aw
jt can be























jt is either equal to pr
jt−1 or determined according to the retailer’s ﬁrst-order condition,
and sc
jt is evaluated accordingly.




The lack of price adjustment in this case implies that the wholesale price is not necessarily
18determined based on the manufacturer ﬁrst-order condition. Regarding the retail price, it is
again possible that the retailer adjusts the retail price in periods when the wholesale price remains
unchanged. However, in practice we rarely observe this case in the data. Hence, we concentrate






Given that the manufacturer does not adjust the wholesale price, it has to be the case that
the proﬁts she makes at pw
jt−1 are at least as large as the proﬁts h ewould have made if she had
changed the price to a counterfactual wholesale price pwc
jt a c c o r d i n gt ot h ep r o ﬁt maximization























As with the case of the retailer, we can exploit this insight to derive a lower bound Aw
jt for the
























The determination of the counterfactual optimal wholesale price pwc
jt and the associated coun-
terfactual market share sc
jt is however more involved in this case, as the manufacturer has to take
into account the reaction of the retailer, who may or may not adjust her price in response to a
wholesale price change.
To ﬁnd the price pwc
jt the manufacturer would set if she were willing to incur the adjustment
cost, we proceed as follows. First, we consider the case in which the retail price would have
changed in response to the wholesale price change. In this case pwc
jt would be determined according
to equation (16) which reﬂects the manufacturer’s ﬁrst-order condition; the inverted manufacturer
reaction matrix Ω−1
wt in this equation incorporates the optimal pass-through of the wholesale price
change onto the retail price.
Next we consider the case in which the retailer does not adjust her price in response to the
wholesale price change. Even though as noted above we never observe this case in the data,
the possibility that the wholesale price change does not get passed through by the retailer is
factored in when manufacturers set prices. If the manufacturer anticipates an equilibrium in
which the retailer does not adjust her price, the optimal manufacturer behavior will be to change
the wholesale price up to the point where the retailer is just indiﬀerent between changing the























19The left hand side of the above equation denotes the proﬁts the retailer would make if she did
not pass-through the change in the wholesale price. The right hand side represents the proﬁts the
retailer would make if she changed the retail price to prc
jt, where the latter is determined based on











jt =0 .T oﬁnd the wholesale price
pwc
jt the manufacturer would charge in this case, equation (21) can be solved simultaneously with
the retailer’s ﬁrst-order condition for pwc
jt and prc
jt.
The ﬁnal step in determining the counterfactual optimal wholesale price pwc
jt that the manu-
facturer would choose if she changed the wholesale price from the previous period is to compare
the manufacturer proﬁts for the case where the retailer adjusts the price, to the manufacturer
proﬁts for the case where the retailer does not pass-through the wholesale price change, in which
case the wholesale price will be set according to (21). The manufacturer will pick the pwc
jt that
corresponds to the higher proﬁts. Once the wholesale price is found, the optimal retail price
response and associated market share can be determined as well, and inserted in (20) in order to
infer the manufacturer adjustment cost lower bound.
3.2 Demand
The estimation of costs, markups, and adjustment costs requires consistent estimates of the de-
mand function as a ﬁrst step. Market demand is derived from a standard discrete-choice model
of consumer behavior. Given that the credibility of all our results will ultimately depend on the
credibility of the demand system, it is imperative to adopt as general and ﬂexible a framework
as possible to model consumer behavior. We use the BLP random-coeﬃcients model described in
Hellerstein (2008), as this model was shown to ﬁt the data well, while imposing very few restric-
tions on the substitution patterns. In the following we provide a brief overview of the model,
and refer the reader to Nevo (2001) and Hellerstein (2008) for a more detailed discussion of the
implementation.
Let the indirect utility uijt that consumer i derives from consuming product j at time t take
the quasi-linear form:
(22) uijt = xjtβi − αipjt + ξjt + εijt = Vijt + εijt,i =1 ,...,I., j=1 ,...,J., t=1 ,...,T.
where εijt is a mean-zero stochastic term. The utility from consuming a given product is a function
of a vector of product characteristics (x,ξ,p)w h e r ep are product prices, x are product charac-
teristics observed by the econometrician, the consumer, and the producer, and ξ are product
characteristics observed by the producer and consumer but not by the econometrician. Let the











+ ΠDi + Σvi
where Di is a vector of demographics for consumer i, Π is a matrix of coeﬃcients that characterize
how consumer tastes vary with demographics, vi is a vector of unobserved characteristics for
consumer i,a n dΣ is a matrix of coeﬃcients that characterizes how consumer tastes vary with
their unobserved characteristics. Conditional on demographics, the distribution of consumer
unobserved characteristics is assumed to be multivariate normal. The demographic draws give
an empirical distribution for the observed consumer characteristics Di. Indirect utility can be
expressed in terms of mean utility δjt= βxjt−αpjt+ξjt and deviations (in vector notation) from
that mean μijt=[ ΠDi Σvi] ∗ [pjt xjt]:
(24) uijt = δjt + μijt + εijt
Finally, consumers have the option of purchasing an “outside” good; that is, consumer i can
choose not to purchase any of the products in the sample. The price of the outside good is assumed
to be set independently of the prices observed in the sample.14 The mean utility of the outside
good is normalized to be zero and constant over markets. The indirect utility from choosing to
consume the outside good is:
(25) ui0t = ξ
0t + π0Di + σ0vi0 + εi0t
Let Aj be the set of consumer traits that induce purchase of good j. The market share of good j





where P∗(dζ) is the density of consumer characteristics ζ =[Dν ] in the population. To compute
this integral, one must make assumptions about the distribution of the error term εijt.A s s u m i n g








14The existence of an “outside” good means that the focus on a single retailer (Dominick’s) does not imply that
this retailer has monopoly power in the retail market; consumers faced with a price increase at Dominick’s have
the option of switching to beer sold in other supermarkets, which represents the “outside” good in our framework.
21The integral is approximated by the smooth simulator which, given a set of N draws from the










Given these predicted market shares, we search for the demand parameters that implicitly mini-
mize the distance between these predicted market shares and the observed market shares by using
a generalized method-of-moments (GMM) procedure.
3.3 Discussion
The framework we just described is static. In this section we explore the implications of dynamic
considerations for our analysis.
Dynamic considerations may aﬀect the analysis in several ways. First, to the extent that con-
sumers and/or retailers hold inventories of beer, the demand and supply side parameter estimates
obtained by the static approach may be biased. Speciﬁcally, on the demand side, Hendel and
Nevo (2006a, 2006b) have shown that when consumers stockpile in response to temporary price
reductions, static demand estimates may overstate the long-run price elasticities of demand by a
factor of 2 to 6.15 On the supply side, Aguirregabiria (1999) has analyzed the pricing behavior of
a monopolistically-competitive retailer that holds inventories in a central store and delivers goods
from this store to individual outlets. He shows that in the presence of ﬁxed ordering costs and
nominal price rigidities inventory dynamics have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the retailer’s decision to
change a brand’s price; ignoring such dynamics may hence lead to biased estimates of the impor-
tance of nominal price rigidities.16 Fortunately, these concerns that both build on the importance
of inventories appear to be less relevant in our case. The industry wisdom is that consumers
typically consume beer within a few hours after its purchase, so that consumer stockpiling is not
a ﬁrst-order concern.17 On the supply side, state and local regulations concerning the distribution
of all alcohol, including beer, in Illinois stipulate that it is illegal for the central store of a retail
chain to maintain inventories of beer and to deliver them to individual outlets.18 This must be
done by ﬁrms exclusively licensed to be distributors. It is also illegal for beer to be transported
from one outlet to another by the central store. So from the point of view of the central store
15Their numbers refer to laundry detergents, however, which consumers stockpile much more intensively than
they do beer.
16The role of inventories is also emphasized in a recent paper by Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2008),
which investigates exchange rate pass-through directly.
17See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. “Beer Shopper Poll,” 2005.
18For more on Illinois liquor regulations, see the homepage of the Illinois Liquor Control Commission at
http://www.state.il.us/LCC/.
22or the individual outlet, there is no inventory problem associated with beer, unlike most other
products which are distributed by the central store. As the central store does not keep inventories
of beer (indeed cannot by law), there is no relationship between inventory decisions and prices.19
And there is no incentive for individual outlets to maintain inventories over a period of longer than
a week, as they can get a new shipment each week from the distributor, rather than bearing the
costs of holding inventories themselves. An additional piece of evidence that stores do not hold
beer inventories comes from the wholesale price series in Figures 1 and 2. In the Dominick’s data,
reported wholesale prices are based on average acquisition costs. If inventories were large and
moved slowly, we would not expect to see the sharp "round-trip" drops we see in our wholesale
price graphs.
A second way in which dynamics can enter the analysis is through intertemporal eﬀects on
the demand side, stemming for example from habit formation. The implications of such dynamics
are explored in Slade (1998) and in a recent theoretical paper by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2007). While we believe that such dynamics are potentially important, it is not feasible
to incorporate them into our current framework in a way that would allow us to estimate the
model. To our knowledge, the only paper that has succeeded in estimating a model similar to
ours but with dynamics on the demand side is the one by Slade (1998), which employs a linear
demand speciﬁcation. In comparison to Slade’s paper, our approach puts more emphasis on the
modelling of the demand side by allowing for a high degree of product diﬀerentiation and consumer
heterogeneity and ﬂexible substitution patterns. We believe that this is important in the context
of the question we are trying to address, since one of the explanations for incomplete pass-through
is markup adjustment by retailers and manufacturers, and there is a close link between markups
and demand structure. However, the price we pay for the complexity of the demand system is
that we have to abstract from demand side dynamics20.
Finally, dynamic considerations may impact the analysis through the modeling of the price
adjustment costs. As pointed out by Dixit (1991), under the assumption of rational expectations
there is an option value in not adjusting prices, which magniﬁes the eﬀects of even small costs
of adjustment. The static approach we adopt, which is most similar to the models of Akerlof
and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985), fails to model this option value and hence may result in
estimates of adjustment costs that are biased upwards. Nakamura (2007) in a recent paper adopts
19As Aguirregabiria argues, “There are some brands for which the central store does not keep inventories. Some
of them are very perishable goods which are delivered daily from wholesalers to outlets (e.g. fresh vegetables, ﬁsh,
some types of bread, etc.) In other cases, they are brands from manufacturers with eﬃcient distribution networks
that allow them to deliver their brands to individual outlets. From the point of view of the company’s central
store, there is not any inventory problem associated with those brands. Since we are interested in the relationship
between price and inventory decisions we only consider those brands for which the central store keeps inventories”
(Aguirregabiria 1999, p. 286).
20We should note however that our static approach is standard in the Industrial Organization literature.
23a dynamic framework to estimate menu costs, which are modeled as random i.i.d. variables. While
the menu costs are derived within a dynamic framework, computational constraints force her to
estimate the cost parameters based on static proﬁt maximization conditions that do not take
menu costs into account, so that there is a tension between the model used to obtain menu costs
and conduct simulations, and the static model that is used to obtain the cost estimates. Our
approach has the advantage that it enables us to maintain a theoretically consistent approach
throughout the analysis. Still, we are concerned about the implications of Dixit’s arguments for
our analysis, so we turn to those next.
Suppose that instead of modeling the manufacturer’s problem21 according to equation (13),
we adopted a dynamic framework, in which the ﬁrm seeks to maximize the expected discounted
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jt}
where δ denotes the discount rate and as before:
Aw




jt > 0 if pw
jt 6= pw
jt−1
Given that there are no dynamics on either the demand or cost side (the market shares
depend only on current and not past prices), it follows that if the ﬁr mw e r ef a c e dw i t hc o s ts h o c k s
that were considered permanent, the dynamic problem would be equivalent to the static one up
to a discount factor: ﬁrms would be maximizing the sum over the (discounted) proﬁts of each
period, which in the absence of any cross-period price eﬀects or inventories would be equivalent
to maximizing period-by-period proﬁts. In contrast, if shocks are perceived as temporary, ﬁrms
will have an incentive to wait to adjust prices, so that the dynamic solution will be diﬀerent from
the static one.
The exchange rate shocks that move the traded component of costs (tcw
jt) around, and are
the focus of our analysis, are highly persistent; empirical work in International Economics has
consistently failed to reject the unit root hypothesis for exchange rates. We therefore believe that
the premise that such shocks are perceived as permanent is not unrealistic. Of course, exchange
rates are not the only source of cost variation. Beer producers also face cost variation caused by
changes in the prices of inputs such as barley, glass and energy. However, there is nothing that
21The argument for the retailer is similar.
24comes close to the variation caused by exchange rate volatility! In Figure 3, we plot the exchange
rate facing beer producers over our sample period along with the prices for glass and energy (all
series are normalized to start at 1 at the beginning of our sample). While there is some variation
in the prices of energy and glass, the exchange rate variation trumps everything else.
In sum, the static approach we adopt provides a reasonable approximation to a dynamic setup
if the main source of cost variation is exchange rates, and if exchange rates are highly persistent.
We believe that both premises are supported by the data.
Finally, we should point out that even though the static model is equivalent to a dynamic model
with static expectations in terms of their implications for pass-through, the exact magnitudes of
the price adjustment costs will diﬀer depending on which of the two models we use to derive them.
In particular, if we use the dynamic model (with static expectations) to derive adjustment cost


















































That is the ﬁrm would compare the ﬁxed cost of adjusting its price today, to the present
discounted value of all future additional proﬁts that it would make if it changed its price. A
similar argument applies to the lower bound Aw
jt . This implies that if we adopted a dynamic
framework, in order to obtain the bounds for the price adjustment costs consistent with the
dynamic model we would have to multiply the static estimates by the factor δ
1−δ,w h i c hi so ft h e
same order of magnitude as the inverse of the interest rate. This would “blow up” the static
estimates for the price adjustment costs. Note however, that this would leave our simulations
and decomposition results at the end of the paper completely unchanged: in the dynamic setup,
both sides of the inequalities (10) and (18) that determine whether the ﬁrm will adjust its price
in response to an exchange rate shock or not, would be multiplied by the same factor ( δ
1−δ), so
that this factor cancels out. This is why we emphasize that the term “price adjustment costs” is
meaningful only within the context of the particular model we use as the basis of the empirical
analysis, and that our results regarding pass-through are robust as long as this term is used
consistently throughout the analysis.
254 Empirical Approach
Our empirical approach has two components: estimation and simulation. At the estimation stage,
we estimate the demand parameters, the traded and non-traded costs and markups of the retailer
and manufacturers, and the upper and lower bounds for the price adjustment costs. As noted
above, these bounds are not by themselves informative regarding the role of price rigidities in
explaining the incomplete cross-border cost shock transmission. To see why, suppose we estimate
the adjustment cost of changing the price of a particular product j to be very small at the retail
level. Still, as long as the adjustment cost is nonzero, it will cause the price of product j to remain
unchanged in some periods. This in turn will aﬀect the pricing of competing products: if the price
of j does not change, then the prices of the products that do change may change by less than they
would if all prices adjusted. Similarly at the wholesale level, the presence of a small adjustment
cost at the retail level may cause the manufacturer to keep the wholesale level price constant if
she anticipates that the retailer will not pass-through the change. Hence, a small adjustment cost
may cause signiﬁcant price inertia at both the retail and wholesale levels.
To assess the overall impact of adjustment costs on pricing behavior we employ simulation.
In particular, we compute the industry equilibrium that would emerge if the dollar appreciated
(depreciated) and prices were fully ﬂexible, that is all adjustment costs were set to zero. Next we
compare this equilibrium to the one that prevails in the presence of price rigidities. We interpret
the diﬀerential response of prices across the two cases as a measure of the overall impact of nominal
price rigidities. In the following we describe each step of our empirical approach in more detail.
4.1 Estimation
The estimation stage consists of the following steps:
1. Demand Estimation
The estimation of the demand system follows Hellerstein (2008). We model the mean utility
associated with product j at time t as follows22:
δjt= βdj−αpjt+∆ξjt
where the product ﬁxed eﬀects dj proxy for both the observed characteristics xjt in the
term in equation (22) and the mean unobserved characteristics. The residual ∆ξjt captures
deviations of the unobserved product characteristics from the mean (e.g., time-speciﬁcl o c a l
22The demand model is also indexed by price zone z. In each period we have observations for two separate price
zones. To keep the exposition simple, we omit the subscript z from our notation.
26promotional activity) and is likely to be correlated with the price pjt; for example, an increase
in the product’s promotional activity may simultaneously increase the mean evaluation of
this product by consumers and a rise in its retail price. Addressing this simultaneity bias
requires ﬁnding appropriate instruments, that is a set of variables zjt that are correlated with
t h ep r o d u c tp r i c epjt but are orthogonal to the error term ∆ξjt. Factor prices and exchange
rates satisfy this condition as they are unlikely to have any relationship to promotional
activities while they are by virtue of the supply relation correlated with product prices.
To construct our instruments we interact hourly wages in each country’s beverage industry
with weekly bilateral exchange rates and indicator variables for each brand; this allows each
product’s price to respond diﬀerently to a given supply shock.
2. Back out the non-traded retail costs ntcr
jt and retail markups using data only
for the periods in which retail prices adjust.
Once the parameters of the demand system have been estimated, we compute the market
share function sjt(pr
t) as well as the own and cross price derivatives ∂skt
∂pr
jt.T h e nw eu s et h e
retailer’s ﬁrst-order conditions for each product j (6) to estimate the non-traded retail costs
of product j.
3. Model these non-traded costs parametrically as a function of observables (e.g.,
zone dummies, month dummies, local wages), and estimate the parameters of
this function using data from the periods for which we observe retail price
adjustment.
The procedure described under Step 2 allows us to back out the retailer’s non-traded costs for
the periods for which we observe the price of a product adjusting, so that we can reasonably
assume that the retailer sets the new price according to the ﬁrst-order conditions. However,
this approach does not work in periods in which the price does not change. To get estimates
of the non-traded costs for these periods we employ the following procedure:
First, we collect the data on the non-traded costs ntcr
jt in Step 2 for the periods in which
the price of product j adjusted. Then we model these costs parametrically as a function of
observables:
ntcr
jtz = cj + γzdz + γwwd
t + η
jtz
where cj are brand ﬁxed eﬀects, dz are price zone dummies, and wd
t denote local wages. We
run the above regression using data from the periods we observe price adjustment, and then
use the parameter estimates to construct the predicted non-traded costs for the periods for
which we do not observe price adjustment.
274. Derivation of upper and lower bounds for the retailer price adjustment costs
Ar
jt.
With the demand parameter and non-traded cost estimates in hand, we employ (10) and
(12) to derived the upper and lower bounds of the retailer adjustment costs Ar
jt.T h e
computation of the upper bound is straightforward: in (10) all variables are observed, except
for the counterfactual market share sc
jt(pr
jt−1,p r
kt) that product j would have if the retailer
did not change her price from the previous period. This counterfactual share can however
be easily evaluated once the demand parameters are estimated, given that the market share
function is known.
The computation of the lower bound based on (12) requires the derivation of the counterfac-
tual optimal price prc
jt that the retailer would charge if she changed the retail price from the
previous period, and the associated market share sc
jt(prc
jt,p r
kt). These are computed using
(8) which reﬂects the ﬁrst-order condition of the proﬁt maximizing retailer.
5. Back out the manufacturer marginal cost cw
jt using data only for the periods in
which wholesale prices adjust.
The procedure here is similar as the one we employ to derive the non-traded costs for the
retailer. In periods when the wholesale price changes, manufacturers behave according to
their ﬁrst-order conditions. Hence, we can use equation (16) to back out the manufacturer
marginal cost cw
jt.
6. Model the manufacturer marginal cost parametrically as a function of observ-
ables (e.g., time dummies, local and foreign wages), and estimate the parameters
of this function using data from the periods for which we observe wholesale price
adjustment.
The manufacturer ﬁrst-order conditions we utilize under Step 5 allow us to back out the
total marginal cost of the manufacturer; however they do not tell us how to decompose
this cost into a traded and non-traded component. Furthermore, it is not possible to back
out the marginal manufacturer costs for the periods when wholesale prices do not adjust
based on this procedure, given that the ﬁrst-order conditions do not necessarily hold then.
To accomplish the above tasks, we model the total manufacturer costs parametrically as a
function of observables, and estimate this function using data from the periods of wholesale
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t denote local domestic and foreign wages respectively, ejt is the bilateral
exchange rate between the producer country and the U.S., pbjt is the price of barley in
the country of production of brand j, Fj is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the product is
produced by a foreign supplier, and zero otherwise, and Dj is a dummy that is equal to 1 if
the product is produced by a domestic supplier, and zero otherwise. For the function to be
homogeneous of degree 1 in factor prices, we require θdw +Fj ∗θfw+Dj ∗θdp+Fj ∗θfp =1 .
Equation (30) can be easily estimated by Least Squares.
The estimation of the above equation for the manufacturer marginal cost serves two pur-
poses. First, it allows us to decompose the total marginal cost into a traded and a non-traded
component. Recall that by deﬁnition the traded component refers to the part of the marginal
cost that is paid in foreign currency and hence is subject to exchange-rate ﬂuctuations. For
domestic producers the traded component will be (by deﬁnition) zero. Foreign producers
selling in the U.S. will generally have both traded and local non-traded costs. The latter
are captured in the above speciﬁcation by the term (wd
t)θdw that indicates the dependence
of foreign producers’ marginal costs on the local wages in the U.S.. The speciﬁcation in (29)
can be used to demonstrate two important facts regarding foreign suppliers’ costs. First,
foreign producers selling to the U.S. will typically experience substantially more volatility
than domestic producers due to their exposure to exchange-rate shocks. Second, as long as
the local non-traded cost component is nonzero (so that θfw + θfp < 123), the dollar de-
nominated marginal cost of foreign producers will change by a smaller proportion than the
exchange rate. This incomplete marginal cost response may partially explain the incomplete
response of exchange-rate changes on to prices.
Estimation of the marginal cost equation (30) furthermore allows us to use the parameter
estimates to construct predicted values for the manufacturer traded and non-traded costs
for the periods in which wholesale price adjustment is not observed.
7. Derivation of upper and lower bounds for the wholesale price adjustment costs
Aw
jt.
The ﬁnal step is to use all parameter estimates obtained in the previous steps to compute the
23Given the assumption of θjdw + Fj ∗ θjfw =1which guarantees homogeneity of degree 1 of the marginal-cost
function in factor prices, if local nontraded costs are zero, then θjdw =0and θjfw =1 . In contrast, with positive
nontraded costs we will have θjfw < 1.
29upper and lower bounds of the manufacturer price adjustment costs based on (18) and (20).
Consider inequality (18) ﬁrst that determines the adjustment cost upper bound. Once steps
1-6 are completed, all variables in this inequality are known, except for the counterfactual
retail price prc
jt that the retailer would charge if the manufacturer did not change her price
in that period. The counterfactual price prc
jt can take on one of two values: it is either equal
to pr
jt−1, or it is determined according to the retailer’s ﬁrst-order condition, conditional on
the retailer observing the wholesale price pw
jt−1. To determine which of the two prices the
retailer will choose, we ﬁrst solve for the optimal price that the retailer would pick if she
behaved according to her proﬁt maximization condition. Then we compare the retail proﬁts
evaluated at this retail price, to the proﬁts that the retailer would make if she kept the
retail price unchanged at pr
jt−1. The retailer will choose the price associated with the higher
retail proﬁts. Once the counterfactual retail price prc
jt has been determined this way, the




kt)),k6= j, c a ne a s i l yb ee v a l u a t e d .
Next consider inequality (20) that determines the adjustment cost lower bound. Again, all
variables in this inequality can be treated as known once steps 1-6 are completed, except
for the counterfactual retail and wholesale prices, prc
jt and pwc
jt respectively, which we would
observe if the manufacturer changed her price from the previous period. To determine those,
we consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case the retail price changes from the previous period; the
optimal prices pwc
jt and prc
jt are then determined according to the manufacturer and retailer
ﬁrst-order conditions, equations (16) and (6) respectively, with the inverted manufacturer
reaction matrix Ω−1
wt reﬂecting the optimal pass-through of the wholesale price change onto
the retail price. Let πwc




Next, consider the case in which the retail price does not change, even though the wholesale
price does. As noted earlier, the optimal manufacturer pricing behavior in this case will
involve changing the wholesale price up to the point where the retailer is just indiﬀerent
between changing her price and keeping it constant at pr
jt−1. The optimal wholesale price
will then be determined based on equation (21) along the lines discussed in the previous
section. Let πwc






2 , the manufacturer will set the wholesale price anticipating that the retailer will
adjust her price too. Hence, the counterfactual prices pwc
jt and prc
jt will satisfy the conditions
described under the ﬁr s tc a s ea b o v e .I fπwc
1 <π wc
2 , the manufacturer will price the product
anticipating that the retailer will not adjust her price. The resulting counterfactual wholesale
price will then satisfy the indiﬀerence condition discussed under the second case, while the
30retail price will remain unchanged at pr
jt−1. Once the counterfactual wholesale and retail
prices have been determined, evaluation of the adjustment cost lower bound based on (20)
is straightforward.
4.2 Simulations and Decomposition of Incomplete Exchange-Rate Pass-Through
To assess the overall impact of adjustment costs on pricing behavior we employ simulations. First,
we compute the industry equilibrium that would emerge if a particular ﬁrm faced an exchange
rate shock and prices were fully ﬂexible, that is, all adjustment costs were equal to zero. In
a second set of simulations, we derive the industry equilibrium under the presence of nominal
rigidities. We interpret the diﬀerential response of prices across the diﬀerent cases as a measure
of the impact of nominal price rigidities.
To be more speciﬁc, to identify the channels through which nominal rigidities aﬀect prices, we
conduct three separate simulations that we brieﬂy describe below.
Simulation 1: Simulate the eﬀect of a 1% exchange-rate change when there are
no price rigidities. To recover manufacturer and retailer pass-through coeﬃcients we derive
the eﬀect of a shock to foreign ﬁrms’ marginal costs (e.g., an exchange rate shock) on all ﬁrms’
wholesale and retail prices by computing a new Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Suppose that an
exchange rate shock hits the traded component of the jth product’s marginal cost (that is the
component that is denominated in foreign currency). To compute the transmission of this shock
to wholesale prices, we substitute the new vector of traded marginal costs, tcw∗
t , into the system
of J nonlinear equations that characterize manufacturer pricing behavior, and then search for the
wholesale price vector pw∗









−1 skt for j =1 ,2,...,J t.
To compute pass-through coeﬃcients at the retail level, we substitute the derived values of
the vector pw∗
t into the system of J nonlinear equations for the retail ﬁr m s ,a n dt h e ns e a r c hf o r
the retail price vector pr∗








−1 skt for j,k =1 ,2,...,J t.









This ﬁrst simulation gives us the benchmark pass-through elasticities that would emerge in
the absence of nominal rigidities. Using our estimation results on the traded and non-traded
31components of manufacturer and retailer costs respectively, we can further decompose these pass-
through elasticities into the part that is due to the presence of traded costs and the part that
reﬂects markup adjustment. Given the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for the manufacturer marginal
cost described earlier, the contribution of the traded costs will be given by the sum of the co-
eﬃcients θfw + θfp (or, in other words, the contribution of local costs to generating incomplete
pass-through will be captured by the coeﬃcient on domestic wages θdw). The diﬀerence between
the derived wholesale pass-through and the one attributed to traded costs reﬂects markup adjust-
ment on the part of the manufacturer. Similarly at the retail level, we can use our estimates of
the retailer non-traded costs to compute the eﬀect that such costs have in generating incomplete
pass-through of wholesale to retail prices; this eﬀect will be given by (dln(pw
j +ntcj)/dlnpw
j ).T h e
diﬀerence between the derived retailer pass-through and the one attributed to retailer non-traded
costs captures the markup adjustment on the part of the retailer.
Next we consider the case where nominal price rigidities are present. Because ﬁrms in our
framework are not symmetric, and price changes will not be synchronized, characterizing the
equilibrium in this case becomes extremely involved. To keep the problem tractable and get a
sense of how price rigidities aﬀect prices, we conﬁne our discussion to two extreme cases; one in
which the ﬁrm facing the exchange rate shock assumes that all other competitors will adjust their
prices, and one in which the ﬁrm under consideration assumes that competitor prices will remain
ﬁxed as a result of nominal rigidities. These cases correspond to the following two simulations:
Simulation 2: Simulate the eﬀect of a 1% exchange-rate change assuming that the
foreign-brand producer facing the exchange rate shock also faces price adjustment
costs but that all other prices adjust freely. In this case, the new industry equilibrium
is computed taking into account the ﬁxed adjustment costs for the foreign brand aﬀected by the
exchange-rate shock included in equations (31) and (32). As discussed earlier, our approach does
not allow us to pin down these adjustment costs, but only derive upper and lower bounds for
these costs. In all simulations involving price adjustment costs we employ the estimated upper
bounds. As we show below, our lower bound estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
By comparing the results from Simulation 2 to the results from Simulation 1 we can get a
sense of the additional eﬀect that price adjustment costs have on pass-through behavior. However,
given that we let competitor prices adjust freely, this simulation captures only the direct eﬀect of
repricing costs, in other words, the eﬀect that a ﬁrm’s own adjustment costs have on its pricing
behavior. It ignores the eﬀect that other ﬁrms’ repricing costs have on a ﬁrm’s decision whether
and by how much to change its price in response to an exchange rate shock. To address this
indirect eﬀect, we conduct the third simulation.
32Simulation 3: Simulate the eﬀect of a 1% exchange-rate change assuming that
the foreign-brand producer facing the exchange rate shock faces price adjustment
costs and also assumes that competitor prices will remain ﬁxed. In this case, the new
industry equilibrium is computed as in Simulation 2, but by additionally imposing that all other
product prices remain unchanged. This simulation captures the indirect or strategic aspect of
repricing costs; even if nominal rigidities do not prevent a particular ﬁrm from adjusting its price,
this adjustment may be smaller if the ﬁrm assumes that nominal rigidities will keep competitor
prices ﬁxed compared to the case without any rigidities. A comparison between the results from
Simulation 3 and Simulation 2 allows us to capture precisely this eﬀect.
5R e s u l t s
This section ﬁrst discusses results from the estimation of the demand system. It then describes
estimates of brand-level markups, non-traded costs, and upper and lower bounds for the retailer
and the manufacturer adjustment costs. Finally, it reports the results from the simulations that
allow us to decompose the incomplete transmission of exchange rate shocks into its sources in
order to quantify the relative contribution of local costs, markup adjustment, and repricing costs
in generating the documented local currency price stability.
5.1 Demand Estimation: Logit Model
Table 4 reports results from estimation of demand using the multinomial logit model. Due to
its restrictive functional form, this model will not produce credible estimates of pass-through.
However, it is helpful to see how well the instruments for price perform in the logit demand
estimation before turning to the full random-coeﬃcients model.24
Table 4 suggests that the instruments have power. The ﬁrst-stage F-test of the instruments,
at 34.45, is signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. The consumer’s sensitivity to price should increase
after we instrument for unobserved changes in characteristics. That is, consumers should appear
more sensitive to price once we instrument for the impact of unobserved (by the econometrician,
not by ﬁrms or consumers) changes in product characteristics on their consumption choices. It
is promising that the price coeﬃcient falls from -0.93 in the OLS estimation to -2.43 in the IV
estimation. Note that the 95-percent conﬁdence interval of the latter coeﬃcient does not include
the value of the former. Results reported in columns 2 and 4 of the table show that including
holiday dummies does not aﬀect the demand coeﬃcients in either the OLS or the IV estimation.
24An appendix (available online at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/economists/hellerstein/papers.html) reports
the ﬁrst-stage results for demand. Most of the coeﬃcients have the expected sign: as hourly compensation increases,
the retail price of each product should increase. T-statistics calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors
indicate that most of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.
335.2 Demand: Random-Coeﬃcients Model
Table 5 reports results from estimation of the demand system. We allow consumers’ income
to interact with their taste coeﬃcients for price and percent alcohol. As we estimate the de-
mand system using product ﬁxed eﬀects, we recover the mean consumer-taste coeﬃcients in a
generalized-least-squares regression of the estimated product ﬁxed eﬀects on product characteris-
tics (maltiness, bitterness, hoppiness and percent alcohol).
The coeﬃcients on the characteristics generally appear reasonable. As consumers’ income
rises, they become less price sensitive. The random coeﬃcient on income, at 0.85, is signiﬁcant at
the ﬁve-percent level. The mean preference in the population is in favor of a bitter taste in beer,
which has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. The mean coeﬃcient on a malty or a hoppy ﬂavor is
negative. As the percent alcohol rises across brands, the mean utility in the population also rises,
an intuitive result. There is heterogeneity in the population with respect to this characteristic:
Those with higher incomes get less utility from a high percent of alcohol in their beer, that is,
prefer light beers. This is consistent with industry lore: Higher income individuals tend to prefer
light and imported beers.25
5.3 Retail Markups and Non-Traded Costs
Table 6 reports retail and wholesale prices and markups for selected imported brands. The
markups are derived using ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions. Under the assumption of no adjustment
costs, the markups would be derived using the ﬁrst-order conditions of every product in every
period. Under the alternative assumption of some adjustment costs, the markups are derived in
each period by using the ﬁrst-order conditions of only those products whose prices adjust from the
previous period. As discussed earlier, many of the price changes in our data reﬂect promotions,
during which the price of a particular brand is reduced for a few weeks (see also Figures 1 and
2). A striking characteristic of these promotions is that product prices return to their exact pre-
promotion level once the promotion is over. In theory, the transition from the discount price to
the pre-promotion level is a price change that could be handled in the same manner as a level
change in price (after all, ﬁrms do incur some cost every time they change the posted price);
yet, given that ﬁrms seem to charge exactly the same price that they were charging before the
promotion, we were skeptical about the plausibility of the assumption that the post-promotion
prices are determined based on ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions. To be safe, we conducted the empirical
analysis both ways, ﬁrst applying the FOC’s to all periods in which the price changed (including
25Our demand side estimates are similar to those obtained in Hellerstein (2008), who estimated a random-
coeﬃcients demand model with the same data, but after aggregating the data up to the monthly frequency. This
m a k e su sc o n ﬁdent that our price elasticities of demand are not aﬀected by the type of arguments made in Hendel
and Nevo (2006b).
34c h a n g e sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hp r o m o t i o n s ) ,a n dt h en excluding those time periods during which ﬁrms
charged the same price as before the promotion. The results did not diﬀer in any signiﬁcant
manner across the two approaches, but the second approach signiﬁcantly reduces the number of
observations associated with a price change than we can exploit in the empirical analysis. Still, in
the remainder of the paper we report results based on this second, more conservative approach,
as we are more comfortable with the assumption that FOC’s hold only in those periods during
which a ﬁrm charges a price that is genuinely diﬀerent from the price charged in earlier periods.
In general, the markups that are derived based on this approach appear reasonable and consistent
with industry wisdom as evident from Table 6. The same applies to the retailer’s non-traded costs
that were derived based on the regression reported in Table 8.
Using a similar procedure we derived the marginal costs facing each beer manufacturer, and
then employed the regression described in equation (30) in Section 4.1 to obtain an estimate of
the "local content" of foreign manufacturers’ marginal cost. This local content is reﬂected in the
magnitude of the "domestic U.S. wages" coeﬃcient that captures the cost share accounted for by
domestic labor. As discussed earlier (see p. 8, in particular footnote 6), because distributors
pricing is coordinated by brewers, we treat the manufacturer and distributor as one entity, so
that the "local" manufacturer costs include the marketing and distribution costs incurred by
the distributor. With a highly signiﬁcant coeﬃc i e n to f0 . 5 2t h es h a r eo fl o c a lc o s t sa p p e a r s
to be substantial. It implies that a big part of foreign manufacturers’ costs of selling in the
U.S. market are not aﬀected by exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Hence it comes as no surprise that
foreign producers do not fully adjust their U.S. dollar prices in response to exchange rate changes.
This ﬁnding implies that even without menu costs, the existence of local, non-traded costs can
generate a signiﬁcant degree of inertia in local currency prices. However, whether local costs can
by themselves fully explain the observed patterns in the price data remains an open question. We
therefore turn to an examination of the price adjustment costs next.
5.4 Adjustment Costs
Table 11 reports the mean estimates by brand of the upper and lower bounds on the retailer’s
and manufacturers’ adjustment costs. The entries in the ﬁrst and third columns report the mean
of each brand’s price-adjustment cost as a share of its total revenue from that brand in that week.
The bounds generally are consistent for each brand as well across the brands. The lower bound is
indistinguishable from zero across brands for both retail and wholesale prices. The upper bounds
on adjustment costs to retail prices range from 0.1 percent of revenue for Heineken to 0.9 percent
of revenue for St. Pauli Girl, with a mean upper bound across foreign brands of 0.4 percent.
Manufacturer adjustment costs are generally larger as a share of revenue than retail adjustment
35costs: Their upper bounds range from 0.0 percent of revenue for Heineken to 4.3 percent of
revenue for Beck’s, with a mean of 3 percent of revenue across all foreign brands. The second
and fourth columns of Table 11 report the sum of the upper bounds for each brand’s menu costs
divided by the total retail (or manufacturer revenue) for that brand, both computed over the
full sample period. These numbers are more comparable to those of the Levy et al (1997) and
Dutta et al (1999) studies, which follow a similar approach of dividing costs of repricing calculated
for only those periods when prices change divided by the revenue earned by the ﬁrm across all
periods, whether prices change or not26. The sum of repricing costs across all foreign brands is
0.1 percent of total revenue for the retailer and 0.5 percent for the manufacturers. As pointed
out earlier, the particular estimates of price adjustment costs are not of interest here, as these
numbers are meaningful only in the particular context of our model27, and are accordingly meant
to be used only in the context of our model in order to perform simulations. Nevertheless, we
ﬁnd it interesting that the order of magnitude of our estimates is similar to the one obtained in
other studies that used a completely diﬀerent methodology.
Finally, Table 12 reports the results of a ﬁxed-eﬀects panel regression of the derived retail
menu costs as a share of revenue on a dummy for a level change in a brand’s price (as opposed
to a sale, that is, a temporary reduction). Adjustment costs appear to be signiﬁcantly higher for
level changes in prices. This ﬁnding provides empirical support for a recent paper by Kehoe and
Midrigan (2007) that is based on the premise that the ﬁxed cost of changing a regular price is
larger than the ﬁxed cost of a temporary reduction.
5.5 Simulations
Using the full random-coeﬃcients model and the derived measures of traded, nontraded, and
repricing costs, we conduct the counterfactual experiments described earlier to analyze how ﬁrms
react to exchange-rate shocks. This subsection presents and discusses the results from these
experiments. We consider the eﬀect of a one-percent foreign currency appreciation on foreign
brands’ prices in three scenarios, each with a diﬀerent assumption about the nature of the repricing
costs faced by foreign brands. We use the results from all three scenarios to assess the relative
importance of foreign ﬁrms’ local non-traded costs, markup adjustment, and repricing costs in
their incomplete pass-through of exchange-rate ﬂuctuations.
26This comparison is subject to the same caveats mentioned in the Introduction, p. 6, footnote 2.
27For example, if we interpreted these numbers in the context of the dynamic model outlined at the end of
Section 3.3, then we would have to divide the current estimates by the interest rate to obtain the price adjustment
costs corresponding to the dynamic setup. If we used an interest rate of 10%, the resulting price adjustment cost
estimates would be around 1% and 5% of revenue for retailers and manufacturers respectively. Levy at al and Dutta
et al’s estimates for retailer costs, which were based on the sum of the labor and material costs associated with a
price change, were 0.70% and 0.59% of the revenue respectively.
36The counterfactual experiments consider the eﬀect of a one-percent appreciation of the relevant
foreign currency on the prices of a British, German, Mexican, and Dutch brand (Bass, Beck’s,
Corona,a n dHeineken, respectively) in twelve exercises reported in Table 13. There are three
panels in the table, each one corresponding to one of the simulations we described above. The
ﬁrst column of the table reports for each simulation the manufacturer pass-through elasticity of
the original shock that is due to local dollar-denominated costs incurred by the manufacturer.
The second column reports the pass-through of the original shock to the wholesale price that
is attributable to manufacturer markup adjustment. The third column reports the (incomplete)
pass-through of the original shock to the retail price due to the presence of a local component in
retail costs. The last column reports the incomplete pass-through of the original shock to the
retail price due to the retailer’s markup adjustment.
Simulation 1: Simulate the eﬀect of a 1% appreciation of the relevant foreign
currency when there are no repricing costs. The ﬁrst counterfactual experiment exam-
ines the manufacturers’ and the retailer’s pass-through following a 1-percent appreciation of the
relevant foreign currency when they face no repricing costs. Its results are reported in the top
panel of Table 13. The median pass-through of the exchange rate shock on manufacturer’s total
marginal cost is 50 percent, which is determined by averaging down the coeﬃcient on local wages
(0.52) from the regressions reported in Table 10: The average local non-traded cost incurred by
a foreign manufacturer is approximately 50 percent of her total costs. Thus, a nontrivial amount
of non-traded value is added at this stage of the distribution chain. Next, manufacturer markup
adjustments are large and vary quite a bit across brands in this counterfactual: With markup
adjustments taken into account, the median pass-through elasticity of the exchange rate shock
to the wholesale price ranges from 13.1 percent for Bass to 33.4 percent for Heineken. It is 18.3
percent across all brands. With retailer local costs taken into account, the median pass-through
becomes 15.4 percent and ranges from 11.2 percent for Bass to 27.1 percent for Heineken. Finally,
the retailer appears to adjust her markup signiﬁcantly for some brands and only marginally for
others: The median retailer pass-through elasticity across all brands is 14.3 percent and ranges
from 11.3 percent for Bass to 26.7 percent for Heineken.
Simulation 2: Simulate the eﬀect of a 1% appreciation of the relevant foreign
currency assuming that only the foreign brand aﬀected by the exchange-rate shock
faces ﬁxed repricing costs, and that all other brands’ prices adjust freely. The second
counterfactual experiment considers how manufacturers and the retailer adjust their prices fol-
lowing a 1-percent appreciation of the relevant foreign currency if they must incur ﬁxed repricing
costs to alter their prices. Its results are reported in the middle panel of Table 13. The median
37pass-through of the exchange rate change on manufacturer total marginal cost is again 50 per-
cent as the share of non-traded costs is unaﬀected by the nature of the counterfactual. But ﬁnal
manufacturer pass-through elasticities now vary signiﬁcantly across brands depending on whether
repricing costs are large enough at this level to prevent manufacturers from changing wholesale
prices. Their median ranges from 0 percent for Bass and Becks, both brands with signiﬁcant
own-brand repricing costs, to around 30 percent for both Corona and Heineken,t h et w oi m p o r t s
with the highest market share. The retailer’s median pass-through elasticities are naturally 0 per-
cent for the two brands that do not change their manufacturer price. For Corona and Heineken,
the pass-through elasticities are around 26 and 27 percent respectively, once the retailer local
costs are taken into account, and slightly lower once retailer markup adjustment is accounted
for. The retail traded pass-through elasticity is 6 percent for all four brands. Thus taking into
account a brand’s own price adjustment costs reduced the average pass-through elasticity from
14.3% in Simulation 1 to 6% in Simulation 2. Note however that this reduction is due to the zero
transmission of the exchange rate shock on the wholesale prices of Bass and Becks due to these
two brands’ manufacturer repricing costs. In contrast, retail repricing costs do not contribute to
any further reductions in the pass-through elasticities. This is consistent with the patterns we
documented earlier that suggest that retail prices always adjust whenever wholesale prices adjust.
Simulation 3: Simulate the eﬀect of a 1% appreciation of the relevant foreign cur-
rency assuming that the foreign ﬁrm aﬀected by the exchange-rate shock faces ﬁxed
repricing costs and also assumes that competitor prices will remain ﬁxed. The third
counterfactual experiment considers whether manufacturers and the retailer adjust their prices
following a 1-percent appreciation of the relevant foreign currency if they take their competitor
prices to be ﬁxed. As before, the own manufacturer repricing costs of Bass and Becks prevent
the wholesale prices of these two brands from adjusting, which translates to zero pass-through
elasticities. But what is interesting in this counterfactual is the fact that the pass-through elas-
ticities in those cases where prices do adjust (Corona and Heineken) are now lower compared to
Simulation 2. This additional reduction in the pass-through elasticities captures the indirect or
strategic eﬀect of repricing costs: because each brand assumes that repricing costs will prevent its
competitors from changing their prices, the brand’s own response to the exchange rate shock is less
pronounced than it would be with ﬂexible prices. Overall, this eﬀect accounts for the reduction of
the manufacturer pass-through elasticity from 8.3% in Simulation 2, to 6.8% in Simulation 3, and
the reduction of the retail pass-through elasticity from 6% in Simulation 2, to 5% in Simulation
3.
385.6 Decomposition of the Incomplete Transmission
Table 14 decomposes the sources of the incomplete transmission of the exchange-rate shock to
retail prices that is documented in Table 13. The ﬁrst column of the table reports the share of
the incomplete transmission that can be attributed to a local dollar-denominated cost component
in manufacturers’ marginal costs. The second column reports the share that can be attributed to
markup adjustment by manufacturers following the shock (separate from any costs of repricing
faced). Columns three and seven report the shares of the incomplete transmission attributable to
the ﬁxed costs of price adjustment incurred by the manufacturer and retailer, respectively, when
they change their own prices (the direct eﬀect of repricing costs). Columns four and eight report
the shares of the incomplete transmission attributable to the eﬀect that the ﬁxed costs of repricing
faced by competitors have on the manufacturer and retailer’s pricing behaviors (the indirect or
strategic eﬀect). The ﬁfth column reports the share attributable to a local-cost component in
the retailer’s marginal costs, and the sixth column the share attributable to the retailer’s markup
adjustment, separate from any markup adjustment associated with repricing costs.
Manufacturers’ local non-traded costs play the most signiﬁcant role in the incomplete trans-
mission of the original shock to retail prices. Following a 1-percent appreciation of the relevant
foreign currency, it is responsible for roughly half, or 52.5 percent, of the observed retail-price in-
ertia. Manufacturers’ markup adjustment accounts for 33.5 percent of the remaining adjustment,
and their own repricing costs for another 10.5 percent. At the retail level, we attribute roughly
1.6 percent of the incomplete pass-through to local non-traded costs. In contrast, the retailer’s
markup adjustment and own repricing costs have a negligible role in explaining the incomplete
transmission. Finally, the competitive eﬀects of rival brands’ repricing costs account for 1.6 and
0.1 percent of the incomplete transmission by manufacturers and retailers, respectively. These
results support the initial intuition conveyed by Figures 1 and 2 that the eﬀects of ﬁxed repricing
costs are most evident in the infrequent adjustment of wholesale prices, while such costs play only
a minor role in explaining the inertia of retail prices.
Overall, local-cost components account for 54.1 percent of the observed price inertia follow-
ing a currency appreciation, ﬁrms’ markup adjustments account for 33.7 percent, manufacturer
repricing costs for 12.1 percent, and retailer repricing costs for 0.1 percent.
6 Conclusions
This paper set out to build a framework that can be used to identify the determinants of local
currency price stability in the face of exchange rate ﬂuctuations. The empirical model we devel-
oped incorporates the three main potential sources identiﬁed in the literature: local non-traded
costs; markup adjustment; and ﬁxed costs of repricing. Our analysis yields several interesting
39ﬁndings.
First, at the descriptive level, we document that while both wholesale and retail prices do
not change every period, retail prices always respond to changes in wholesale prices. Hence, it
appears that infrequent price adjustment is primarily driven by the behavior of wholesale prices.
Second, when we use our model to derive upper and lower bounds for the ﬁxed costs of price
adjustment facing retailers and manufacturers, we ﬁnd that these costs are substantially higher
for manufacturers than for retailers, both in absolute terms and as a share of revenue. Third,
the counterfactual simulations we conduct in order to decompose the incomplete transmission
of exchange rate shocks into its sources suggest that both local non-traded costs and markup
adjustment are important in generating local currency price stability. However, these two fac-
tors alone cannot completely explain the incomplete pass-through of exchange rate changes to
consumer prices. To generate the pass-through observed in the data we need to allow for price
adjustment costs. To be more speciﬁc, local costs and markup adjustment put together generate
an exchange rate pass-through of approximately 18%. The pass-through observed in our data
is between 6 and 7%. The missing 11-12% represent the overall impact of costs of repricing.
These rigidities aﬀect primarily the adjustment of wholesale prices; their eﬀect on retail prices is
very minor, and operates only indirectly through the strategic interaction of competing brands.
Why nominal price rigidities are present primarily at the wholesale but not retail level is - in
our opinion - an intriguing question worth further exploration. One possible explanation is that
wholesale prices are set through long-term contracts and are therefore less responsive to changes
in economic conditions. We hope that future research can shed more light into this issue.
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Figure 1: Weekly retail and wholesale prices for Bass Ale. Prices are for a single six-pack and are
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Figure 2: Weekly retail and wholesale prices for Corona. Prices are for a single six-pack and are
















exchange rate glass energy
Figure 3: The nominal exchange rate varies by more than do typical input prices for German
brewers.
45Description Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Retail prices ($ per six-pack) 5.44 5.79 1.28
Wholesale prices ($ per six-pack) 4.50 4.92 1.09
Dummy for retail-price change (=1 if yes) .18 0 .24
Dummy for wholesale-price change (=1 if yes) .06 0 .16
Table 1: Summary statistics for prices for the 16 products in the sample. 6464 observations.
Source: Dominick’s.
Description Mean Median Std Minimum Maximum
Percent Alcohol 4.52 4.60 .68 2.41 6.04
Bitterness 2.50 2.10 1.08 1.70 5.80
Maltiness 1.67 1.20 1.52 .60 7.10
Hops (=1 if yes) .12 — — — —
Sulfury/Skunky (=1 if yes) .29 — — — —










































Table 3: Some preliminary descriptive results. The dependent variable is the retail or the wholesale
price for a six-pack of each brand of beer. The exchange-rate is the average of the previous week’s
bilateral spot rate between the foreign manufacturer’s country and the United States (is the
number of dollars per unit of foreign currency). All regressions include brand, price-zone, and
week ﬁxed eﬀects. The second and fourth columns of the table report results from regressions
with controls for domestic and foreign costs. The coeﬃcients on the control variables, and their
sources, are ireported in the appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses: Those starred are
signiﬁcant at the * 5-percent or ** 1-percent level. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Variable OLS OLS IV IV
Price -.93 -.92 -2.43 -2.43
(.01)∗∗ (.01)∗∗ (.35)∗∗ (.35)∗∗
Holiday .06 .001
(.02)∗∗ (.01)
First-StageR e s u l t s
F-Statistic 34.45 34.24
Observations 6464 6464 6464 6464
Instruments wages wages
Table 4: Diagnostic results from the logit model of demand. Dependent variable is ln(Sjt) −
ln(Sot). Both regressions include brand ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Costs are domestic wages in the beverage industry interacted with weekly nominal exchange
rates for foreign brands. Source: Authors’ calculations.












Percent Alcohol 4.91∗ -1.08∗
(.05) (.09)
Table 5: Results from the full random-coeﬃcients model of demand. Based on 6464 observations.
Asymptotically robust standard errors in parentheses. Starred coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5-percent
level. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Brand Retail price Manufacturer price Retail markup Manufacturer markup
Bass $6.92 $5.76 $0.43 $0.37
Beck’s $5.61 $4.61 $0.42 $0.37
Corona $5.72 $4.75 $0.39 $0.36
Guinness $7.46 $5.86 $0.69 $0.50
Heineken $6.16 $5.06 $0.39 $0.37
Table 6: Mean prices and price-cost markups for selected brands. The markup is price less marginal













Molson Golden .30 .30
(.056)∗∗ (.060)∗∗




Table 7: Backed-out and ﬁtted non-traded costs incurred by the retailer by brand. Each entry
reports the mean across weeks of the backed-out or ﬁtted measure of a brand’s non-traded cost to the
retailer in cents per six-pack. Standard errors from bootstrap simulations with 200 draws reported in








Table 8: Results from regressions of backed-out retailer non-traded costs on determinants. De-
pendent variable is retailer’s non-traded cost which varies by week. Huber-White robust standard errors












Molson Golden 3.29 3.31
(.04)∗∗ (.04)∗∗
St. Pauli Girl 4.22 4.28
(.00)∗∗ (.10)∗∗
Table 9: Backed-out and ﬁtted total costs incurred by foreign manufacturer by brand. Each
entry reports the mean across weeks of the backed-out or ﬁtted measure of a brand’s total cost to the
manufacturer in cents per six-pack. Standard errors from bootstrap simulations with 200 draws reported
in parentheses under each coeﬃcient. Those starred signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level.
Brand Bass
Domestic U.S. wages .52
(.12)∗∗





Table 10: Results from constrained linear regression of foreign manufacturer total backed-out
costs on determinants. Dependent variable is manufacturer’s total marginal cost for periods when the
wholesale price changes which varies by week. Includes brand ﬁxed eﬀects. Source: Authors’ calculations.
50Retailer Manufacturer
Brand Mean Total Mean Total
Bass 0.302% 0.079% 2.456% 0.313%
(.215) (.064) (.499)∗∗ (.091)∗∗
Beck’s 0.379% 0.208% 3.196% 1.127%
(.332) (.179) (.060)∗∗ (.208)∗∗
Corona 0.078% 0.020% 0.269% 0.060%
(.054) (.022) (.128)∗∗ (.039)
Guinness 0.483% 0.224% 0.909% 0.051%
(.666) (.324) (.772) (.060)
Heineken 0.096% 0.029% 0.306% 0.21%
(.057) (.019) (.386) (.024)
Molson Golden 0.413% 0.158% 2.275% 0.688%
(.232) (.091) (.611)∗∗ (.190)∗∗
St. Pauli Girl 0.866% 0.395% ··
(.299)∗∗ (.140)∗∗
Overall 0.370% 0.121% 2.157% 0.443%
(.232) (.009)∗∗ (.373)∗∗ (.077)∗∗
Table 11: Upper bounds for the retailer’s and manufacturers’ adjustment costs as a share of
revenue by brand. The entries in the ﬁrst and third columns report the mean across markets of the
estimates of a brand’s price-adjustment cost as a share of its total revenue. The second and fourth columns
report the sum of the upper bounds on each brand’s menu costs divided by the total retail or manufacturer
revenue for that brand over the full sample period. Source: Authors’ calculations.






Table 12: Regression of retailer’s ﬁxed adjustment costs as a share of its revenue on a dummy for
a level retail-price change. The regression includes brand ﬁxed eﬀects. Source: Authors’ calculations.
52Manufacturer: Retailer:
Markup Markup
Traded Adjustment Traded Adjustment
No repricing costs
Bass 50.1 13.1 11.2 11.3
(.000)∗∗ (.0995) (.0878) (.1251)
Beck’s 50.1 16.3 13.5 13.4
(.000)∗∗ (.1108)∗∗ (.1006)∗∗ (.1243)∗∗
Corona 50.1 29.9 26.3 25.5
(.000)∗∗ (.0728)∗∗ (.0632)∗∗ (.1236)∗∗
Heineken 50.1 33.4 27.1 26.7
(.000)∗∗ (.0641)∗∗ (.0544)∗∗ (.1160)∗∗
All 50.1 18.3 15.4 14.3
(.000)∗∗ (.1040)∗∗ (.0906)∗∗ (.1326)
Own-brand repricing costs
Bass 50.1 0 0 0
(.000)∗∗ (.000) (.000) (.000)
Becks 50.1 0 0 0
(.000)∗∗ (.000) (.000) (.000)
Corona 50.1 29.9 26.3 25.5
(.000)∗∗ (.0728)∗∗ (.0632)∗∗ (.1236)∗∗
Heineken 50.1 33.4 27.1 26.7
(.000)∗∗ (.0641)∗∗ (.0544)∗∗ (.1160)∗∗
All 50.1 8.3 6.2 6.0
(.000)∗∗ (.0632) (.0344) (.0566)
Competitor-brand repricing costs
Bass 50.1 0 0 0
(.000)∗∗ (.000) (.000) (.000)
Becks 50.1 0 0 0
(.000)∗∗ (.000) (.000) (.000)
Corona 50.1 29.4 26.1 25.2
(.000)∗∗ (.0728)∗∗ (.0632)∗∗ (.1236)∗∗
Heineken 50.1 32.1 26.6 25.9
(.000)∗∗ (.0641)∗∗ (.0544)∗∗ (.1160)∗∗
All 50.1 6.8 5.3 5.0
(.000)∗∗ (.0510) (.0302) (.0310)
Table 13: Counterfactual experiments: median pass-through of a 1-percent appreciation of the
relevant foreign currency. Median over 404 markets. Retailer’s incomplete pass-through: the retail
price’s percent change for the given percent change in the exchange rate, attributed to the presence of local
dollar-denominated costs or to the retailer’s markup adjustment. Manufacturer’s incomplete pass-through:
the manufacturer price’s percent change for a given percent change in the exchange rate, attributed to the
share of local dollar-denominated costs in the manufacturer’s total costs or to the manufacturer’s markup
adjustment. Source: Authors’ calculations.
53Manufacturer Retailer
Local Markup Costs of Local Markup Costs of
Costs Adj. Repricing: Costs Adj. Repricing:
Own Other Own Other
Bass 49.9 37.0 13.1 0 0 0 0 0
Beck’s 49.9 33.8 16.3 0 0 0 0 0
Corona 66.7 27.0 0 0.7 4.4 1.1 0 0.1
Heineken 67.3 22.5 0 1.8 7.4 0.5 0 0.4
All 52.5 33.5 10.5 1.6 1.6 0.2 0 0.1
Table 14: Counterfactual experiments: Decomposition of the incomplete transmission of a 1-
percent appreciation of the relevant foreign currency to consumer prices. Median over 404 markets.
Local costs: the share of the incomplete transmission explained by the presence of a local dollar-denominated
component in foreign manufacturers’ or the retailer’s marginal costs. Markup adjustment: the share of the
incomplete transmission explained by the retailer or manufacturer’s markup adjustment excluding markup
adjustment due to ﬁxed costs of price adjustment. Repricing costs own: Fixed costs of price adjustment
incurred by the manufacturer or retailer to change its own price. Repricing costs, other: The eﬀect of
competitors’ costs of price adjustment on the manufacturer or retailer’s own price adjustment behavior.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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